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| Thread: Waterloo Mythology | |
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privatehudson
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posted August 06, 2004 04:20 PM |
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Waterloo Mythology
An article by Neil Holmes/Private Hudson
I’m sure the battle of Waterloo, as one of the most famous in western history needs little introduction, but here goes anyway. Fought on the road between between the Belgian/French Border town of Charleoi and the present capital of Brussels the battle saw the matching of an Anglo-Dutch force lead by Wellington alongside a Prussian army under Blucher against the French Imperial army lead by Napoleon. It would be the first and only time what was arguably the period’s two greatest commanders would meet in battle. With the French numerically superior to the Anglo-Dutch armies, but inferior in numbers to the combined Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies, time was of the essence. Napoleon knew without a doubt that he had to win convincingly before the Prussians arrived to turn the tide against him, enabling him to turn his army once and for all on Blucher’s and open the way to Brussels.
Deployed on a rolling series of ridges the Anglo-Dutch armies were lead by the British army’s finest officer of the day. Wellington was unbeaten in all of his career, an experienced and talented commander who cared for his men. His army was a mix of formations drawn from the Netherlands, Belgium, Hannover, Nassau, Britain (including Ireland), Brunswick and others. Some of his forces were experienced in battle, others were raw recruits unused to campaigning. Wellington especially mistrusted his Dutch/Belgian allies who had been fighting for Napoleon for most of the wars. His Prussian allies began the day far from the battlefield, marching to reinforce Wellington and together crush the “Corsican ogre”. Their army relied heavily on Landwehr formations to make up the numbers, but their commanders were talented and experienced.
Napoleon had returned less than 100 days before to overthrow the unpopular king and restore himself to the throne he had abdicated only the year before. Calling the old soldiers back to service and recalling some of his senior officers and marshals to his side he rebuilt the army for the inevitable conflict to come. His forces comprised in their ranks many veterans of the 1814 campaign and earlier fighting and were experienced and feared throughout Europe. Napoleon, seeing that the coalition against him (comprising at least Austria, Prussia, The Netherlands, Spain, Britain and Prussia) were determined decided to strike first and launched his army into the Netherlands to attack the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies there.
Striking quickly the French smashed into the isolated and divided allies and inflicted a telling defeat against the Prussians at Ligny. Napoleon then followed form, turning against Wellington whilst detailing a small force to watch the Prussians. The field of Waterloo was the test of talent and ability between Wellington and Napoleon, the place were Napoleon gambled all one last time. Attacking at midday (heavy rain the night before made it impossible to move guns before then) Napoleon’s assaults began with two events, D’Erlon’s attack against the centre right of Wellington’s line. The attack broke down when the British unleashed their heavy cavalry who rode down the infantry with ease before being demolished by the French cavalry in a counter charge. Matters returned to a stalemate, the French had also launched a (initially supposed diversion) attack on an isolated farmhouse on the right of the allied line called Hougomont which failed time and again, drawing more and more troops into the attack all the time.
In the meantime, Ney ordered a series of extensive Cavalry charges against the Allied ridge interspersed with cannonades of the line. The Allied lines thinned and wavered but held time and again, returning the casualties back at the French horse, drawing more and more of their ranks into a pointless engagement. By this time the Prussians were drawing close to the fighting and began to engage the French right wing under the small corps of Lobau. Attacked on both sides, Ney and Napoleon knew that time was running out. Extricating some troops from the attack on Hougomont and combining them with men from D’Erlon’s corps Ney succeeded in prising the Allies out of La Haye Sainte, the farmhouse that had provided the bastion of the allied centre. The way lay open for Ney to launch one last shattering attack on the Allied line.
Unfortunately by then Prussian pressure was immense, with Lobau’s men overwhelmed, Napoleon sent both young and some middle guard battalions to engage them around Plancenoit. Then came the final attack, with all else spent Napoleon threw in his last reserve, the old guard supported by the remains of the middle guard. Wellington was lucky, he had been able to pull reserves from quiet areas to reinforce the centre of the line. The Guard hit the centre of the line in massed column/square like formations only to be shot to pieces by the allied formations and overwhelmed. French morale collapsed on the spot, to the cries of “La Garde Recule!” the stunned French collapsed into a mob. The Prussians finally overwhelmed their opposition in Plancenoit, the British streamed down from their ridge and the race began. Save some few battalions of the guard who remained suicidally loyal, the French army fled the field.
The battle had been an especially bloody one. Only one man in Wellington’s staff escaped the battle without a wound for example, and tens of thousands were killed or wounded. Napoleon was forced to flee the battlefield and abdicate soon after to die barely 6 years later, miserable and confined to an island.
The following article attempts to address some common theories about Waterloo and dispel them. I’m not trying to say that every French/British/German person thinks this, rather that the many books on the topic by authors from those countries, or movies from that perspective often perpetuate those myths. I hope those of you with some interest in the period find it interesting. To some degree I have mentioned a lot of this before, but never as an entire topic, so here it is…
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privatehudson
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posted August 06, 2004 04:21 PM |
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Common British Misconceptions about the battle:
Prussian forces turned up late at waterloo and without them we probably would have won anyway. Mostly they didn't really do much.
They were late it's true, but the Prussian arrival literally saved Wellington's bacon. The troops that held the line steady after La Haye Saint fell and those that repulsed the old Guard were only able to be there because Wellington had pulled troops from his left flank. He was able to pull the troops out from there because an entire Prussian corps arrived to replace them. Also the Prussian attacks tied down some 15,000 French troops (Lobau's VI corps plus cavalry and later some Young and Middle guard) for much of the battle either in reserve or engaged. It's easy to see that without Prussian intervention, even a draw would have been hard for even Wellington to pull off.
And as to why they were late? Gniesenau didn't trust the British one bit and felt they would abandon the Prussians and head for the coast (partly because of our failiure to intervene in Ligny, partly because of political reasons). He followed Blucher's orders and marched to Waterloo, but marched his furthest corps from Waterloo through the others to head the line.
Dutch Belgians generally ran away at the sight of the enemy
Not really, the D-B militia fought badly on a number of occasions it's true, but in the main they fought hard and well, especially certain formations. It should also be noted that many Prussian and British formations did badly during the campaign
The prince of Orange was a hopeless fop with no talent for military matters
This is both true and a gross injustice. Much of what is said about him forming infantry into lines against cavalry he could not see is true, BUT on the eve of Quatres Bras, Wellington gave an order to abandon the crossroads to the French and for the D-B formation to withdraw. Orange countered the order and they stayed. Their presence enabled the British to hold the vital crossroads on the day of the battle and helped the campaign considerably. Orange was inexperienced and made mistakes, however it's unfair to say he was stupid or foolish. He simply was in too deep and had no training for what he was doing.
The French attacked in column and were driven off by two deep line
True and false. The British accounts often talk of the French attacking in the old manner and being driven off in the old manner. However at Waterloo, when D'Erlon's first assault went ahead, the tactics used were noticeably not the same. Though the approach matched a column-like appearance, it was extremely flexible and easier to manoeuvre into line. What it couldn't easily do was form square. This was unfortunate, as the British cavalry commander, Uxbridge lead a brilliant counter offensive that put the corps out of the battle for some time before being crushed for going too far. However, if we rewind and remove Uxbridge's timely intervention we see another story. D'Erlon's men were in the process of forming lines of battle when struck, lines much longer than the British ones they faced. The tactic would have been a success had it not been hit at that point. Ok, so it was hit, but the point shows that the French really never had the intention of using the column to attack, their principle was to manoeuvre so that superiority could be found then form line to attack. Here it nearly worked, and therefore, the old principle of column being defeated by line is on shaky ground. (though to be fair the Guard did attack in columns/Squares)
Ney was (at Quatre Bras) a cautious fool who failed to do his duty and take the crossroads. At Waterloo he was an idiot with no tactical sense who wasted the cream of French cavalry without orders against solid British foot by charging at them for most of the afternoon without rhyme or reason. If one is ever offered it's usually that he couldn't tell the difference between a reforming of the line (what Wellington was doing) and a retreat.
Quatres Bras: Examine Ney's position. Initially untrusted by Napoleon for his "bring him back in an iron cage" remark Napoleon refused to call Ney for duty unti mere days before the campaign. Ney had so little time that he had to ride from his house near Paris to the front without aides or spare horses. Napoleon's orders to his subordinates were startlingly vague and loose. Under Berthier, his former chief of staff this would have been interpreted to each commander and done properly. Under Soult, a Marshal totally unused to such a role they were not. Ney was in a position were he had to fight a campaign from scratch with almost no help or knowledge of what he should do! Whilst it's easy to look at things and say "yes, he should have taken the crossroads" I think history has been a little harsh on him over this
Waterloo: Ok, now lets examine Ney's career. Yes Ney was a hothead, once or twice in his career he had nearly spoilt a battle through impetuosity in the face of the enemy. However, Ney was also an extremely capable commander of men with well over 20 years experience in the army and had seen more battles than just about anyone else on the field on that day. Ney would have known the difference between a reforming of the line and a retreat. Then think this, Ney launched about a dozen cavalry attacks up the ridges and against the British lines. Three at most would have been needed to confirm that they had not retreated, would not withdraw, and that the attacks were not working. For all his hot-headed attitude, Ney was no fool, it's hard to believe he was making 12 separate mistakes. So why did he do that?
Well I and some others I have read think that Ney did it because he had to do it. Reille's corps was mostly engaged at Hougomont, D'Erlon's was shattered by the British cavalry and reforming, Lobau's was in reserve facing the oncoming Prussians who had appeared in the distance, The Guard would never have been released to him so early. Ney quite literally had no infantry left! Though D'Erlon would reform and some of Reille's men could be pulled out of the Hougomont engagement, this needed time. Ney had a mostly intact Allied army before him and time running out. He could not afford to let Wellington take the initiative like he had proved he could in the peninsula, his only option was to pin Wellington's army with cavalry to buy time for the infantry to reform. Remember that Ney used the Guard cavalry, this needed Napoleon's agreement. At some point, Napoleon at least once agreed to what Ney was doing. Not only was Ney doing what he had to, Napoleon agreed!
The Grenadier Guards of the British army are so named for their repulse of the Grenadiers A' Pied during the Old Guards assault at the end of the battle. British troops, and specifically the foot guards were the main ones involved in this action.
Uhmm no. The foot Guards plus a regiment of foot who wheeled and fired into the French unit's flank drove back a formation of Chasseurs A' Pied, not Grenadiers. On top of this, it was the Dutch Belgians in the form of Nassauers plus a battery of theirs firing at point blank range that halted the Grenadiers of Napoleon's guard.
French Misconceptions about the battle:
Ney was responsible for defeat at waterloo. If not Ney, see below
As pointed out above, Ney tried his best and was almost certainly following Napoleon's instructions. His early attack under D'Erlon was inventive and his cavalry charges were necessary. Ney's position at Waterloo was an almost impossible one given the strategic situation Napoleon had imposed on him.
Grouchy, by failing to either prevent the Prussians from reaching Waterloo, or arriving there caused the French to loose waterloo
Ok, Grouchy simply was also given an impossible task. In command of the right wing of Napoleon's army he helped win the battle of Ligny, an important and considerable victory over the Prussians. However, despite protests, Napoleon refused to allow Grouchy to pursue the Prussians that night! Not only this, but Napoleon then paraded the army the next morning before leaving to join Ney, confident that the Prussians were so scattered that they would never reform. He left Grouchy with orders to locate the Prussians, keep them from intervening against Ney's flank and pursue them.
However, this was clearly impossible. Napoleon's refusal to pursue at the earliest moment meant that Grouchy had no earthly idea were the Prussians were, and also they were not as broken as Napoleon arrogantly assumed they were. Grouchy was well over 1/2 a day behind the Prussians and was never able to make this up again. By the time he was permitted to withdraw Gniesenau had recovered Blucher (he had been ridden over whilst leading a cavalry attack in his 70s! Though recovered by a counter-charge, he was missing for some time) and had been ordered to withdraw to Wavre in order to decide whether to come to Wellington's aid or not. Grouchy followed dutifully but was never going to be able to catch up realistically.
Then came the day of Waterloo. Napoleon had left Grouchy with orders to locate the Prussians and engage them. Part way through the day he sent further orders for Grouchy to manoeuvre between the Prussians and Waterloo and prevent them from reaching the battle there. Bear in mind that not only was this impossible terrain wise, Grouchy possessed barely 30,000 men. Blucher possessed well over 100,000 men in two commands (80-90,000 heading to Waterloo with perhaps some 20,000 stationed at Wavre to block Grouchy). The only possible way Grouchy could have stopped Blucher would have been to begin the day between Blucher and Waterloo with a fine defensive position to occupy. Napoleon stopped this by his delaying after Ligny.
Finally, Napoleon sent a further order to Grouchy demanding that he send considerable forces to aid him at Waterloo whilst STILL keeping the Prussians at bay. Napoleon was expecting Grouchy's 30,000 to simultaneously turn up with maybe 20,000 men at waterloo whilst using his remaining 10,000 to hold the Prussians at Wavre off his back. I'm sure you've seen the film Waterloo in which Napoleon wonders why Grouchy did not arrive. The truth is Grouchy was a fine commander and was doing exactly what Napoleon had ordered him to do! Napoleon fans repeatedly cite Grouchy as a cause for defeat saying he should have marched to the guns at Waterloo. If he had done this all he would have achieved would have been to arrive on the field with 80,000 Prussians ahead of him and leave 20,000 behind him! Bear in mind also that Grouchy received this so late on the day that even had he set off right there and then he would never have reached Waterloo anyway.
The truth is Grouchy failed at nothing, he was where he was ordered to be, doing what he conceivably could do. He failed to carry out Napoleon's orders because they were impossible. Grouchy has been hard-done by in literature and films, he was a first rate commander of men and especially cavalry who conducted himself well throughout the campaign. In the aftermath of Wavre/Waterloo he marched on Brussels (as per Napoleon's orders as he had at that stage no idea what had happened at Waterloo) and when made aware of the fate of Napoleon's forces conducted a brilliant withdrawal to the border in order to keep his forces intact, despite facing virtually the entire allied army!
Ney was at fault in the Ligny/Quatre bras engagements for the inactivity of 1 corps.
Partly true, Napoleon's orders though were very vague and hinted that both I and II corps would be under Ney for the campaign, though they would be withdrawn if needed by the emperor. However, Ney was facing a situation were he was steadily being overwhelmed by the allies in front of him and was incapable of doing his orders because of it. Napoleon (through Soult) also neglected to ensure that Ney was informed leaving Ney at a loss as to what was happening to half of his command! It is true that the Prussians would have been even more soundly beaten than they were at Ligny with the support of that corps, but to blame it's absence solely on Ney was unfair.
Napoleon was severely ill throughout the battle of waterloo and knew almost nothing of the events of most of it.
Yes Napoleon was ill at some point during the engagement, NO this does not stretch to the extent that French writers like to claim it does. Napoleon at least twice for example verified and knew of the cavalry attacks. He commanded or directed at least 2 infantry assaults, namely D'Erlon's first and the Guard at the end. He probably knew of and supported most of Ney's actions and orders.
Truth be told, Napoleon was the reason he lost the campaign. Though his planning and opening moves were brilliant, the moment from crossing the border he made gross mistakes. He put Grouchy and Ney in an impossible position for the battles of Waterloo and Wavre and performed poorly on the field for Waterloo where his tactics were basically frontal assault. Napoleon had no-one to blame for loosing than himself.
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privatehudson
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posted August 06, 2004 04:22 PM |
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Prussian Misconceptions about the battle:
The British failed to arrive at Ligny because they did not wish to
Wellington promised Blucher to come to his aid if Napoleon's main attack fell there (and vice versa) if possible. He failed to do this at Ligny/Quatres Bras. Wellington had over-estimated the speed at which his army could concentrate on Quatres Bras. He did this because De Lancey, his Quarter Master General calculated the ability of troops to march based on their daytime marching speed, not the nightime marches. In the night following the Duchess' ball the troops simply could not match daytime marches and Wellington simply did not have the troops to hand to affect an arrival on the Ligny battlefield.
Gniesenau though blamed Wellington saying that he had betrayed the alliance like he always felt the British would. The background to that was that at Vienna there had been a major fall-out between Prussia and Austria about some of the "German" territories. After initially promising to support Prussia the British switched sides and backed Austria, pulling in Royalist France's support. Prussia relied on Russia for backing. This was quite a serious affair and could have lead to war. At the very least it lead to considerable ill feeling between the British and Prussians, which Gneisenau never forgot.
Wellington was obsessed with defending his route to his costal supplies and would flee at the drop of a hat if they were threatened.
This actually holds some water in a way. On the day of Waterloo, a fair few thousand British regulars were deployed still at a place called Hal protecting the line of retreat. To be fair to Wellington though he had little choice as those was his orders. Wellington also did all he could to co-operate with Blucher and his courage in keeping the army on the Mon St Jean ridge to await Blucher's arrival showed trust. The accusation is a bit harsh IMO.
Well, there it is, my first article of sorts, hope the format is ok for you guys and that it wasn’t TOO boring 
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